Abstract: Though upper echelons theory has predicted a close link between CEO characteristics and executive compensation, the effect of CEO age on executive compensation gap (ECG) has not been explored. The study investigates such a topic by taking the Chinese listed manufacturing listed companies over 2011-2013 as the research sample. Multiple regression analysis based on OLS with SPSS19.0 indicates that CEO age has a significantly positive effect on ECG, which does not change with the change of variable measures and empirical methods. The new findings is critical for enriching the upper echelons theory in the research field of the consequences of CEO age and the antecedents of ECG.
Introduction
From the upper echelons perspective, CEO's personal characteristics affect corporate policies. For instance, personal life experiences, overconfidence, and leverage preferences shape a CEO's financing decisions and attitudes towards risk (Malmendier and ). Yet, although CEO age is easily observable and reachable, there is surprisingly limited evidence on how a CEO's age affects the CEO's corporate policies, for example, the executive compensation policies.
Executive compensation has received significant attention in both academic research and the popular business press (Tosi et al., 2000) . Among all the dimensions of executive compensation, executive compensation gap (ECG) is the one which has received the least attention and is receiving much greater attention from the scholars. ECG is a critical issue all over the world (Hambrick, &Siegel, 1997) . The reasonable setting of ECG is one of the greatest puzzles among the effective corporate governance practices. ECG can express the distribution pattern and the distribution efficiency of the total executive compensation, and it can be said that ECG actually can reflect both the mechanisms of benefits incentives and career advancements (Fredrickson, &Sanders, 2010 ; Lu Hai-fan, 2007).
ECG and CEO age are well studied topic areas within the management literature. To date, however, there has been limited literature that has incorporated both topics in a single study. In order to fill this gap, this paper tries to link ECG and CEO age by adopting the Chinese listed manufacturing companies over 2011-2013 as the sample to empirically analyze the effect of CEO age on ECG.
Literature and Hypothesis
There are three groups of influencing factors of ECG, respectively, the industry environment factors, the corporate governance factors and the top management teams (TMT) factors (Andrew McGee et al., 2015; Zhang Changzheng, 2016).
The following three paths can conclude a negative relationship between CEO age and ECG. First, based on norms of fairness (Phillips, & Reichart, 2000) , some research suggests CEOs may take actions towards fair outcomes for individuals other than themselves (Wade et al., 2006) , especially it is true when CEO is older. When a CEO grows older, his/her favor in fairness would increase. In this case, the rapid growth ECG would be constrained; Second, an older CEO would has stronger needs for good interpersonal connections and harmonious feelings within the TMT. In this case, an older CEO would intend to set a lower ECG in order to reach the friendship from the other top executives; Third, when a CEO is getting older and older, his/her energy would get weakened and his/her knowledge & expertise would get outdated. In order to maintain the high-qualified operation of the company, an older CEO would have to empower the other top executives with much higher power and discretion. Therefore, the paper can propose a hypothesis named H1a:
H1a: CEO age has negative effect on ECG
The following three paths can conclude a positive relationship between CEO age and ECG. First, according to the views of personality psychology, overconfidence would increase with the growth of CEO age, which would make an older CEO own an illusion of being "omnipotent". The contributions and efforts of the other top executives in his/her TMT would be underestimated, and thus a lower compensation level for them would be understood easily. Besides, CEO overconfidence results in more risky corporate behavior (Rayna Brown, &Neal Sarma, 2007). Higher ECG, in the light of tournament theory, is more risky and of higher potential in motivating top executives with the higher risk of destroying fairness among the top executives. Therefore, an overconfident CEO prefer a higher ECG. In this case, ECG would grows with the growth of CEO age; According to the perspective of managerial power theory, older CEO usually has higher power and discretion in setting and even manipulating ECG. In this case, an older CEO would have the freedom to enlarge ECG at his/her wish. the paper can provide a hypothesis named H1b: Measures: CEO age (CAGE) is measured by the chronological age of the CEO to the responding sample year. The paper does the decimals of CAGE to round up and round down numbers; Executive compensation gap: ECG1 is measured by the difference between CEO cash compensation and the average cash compensation of the other top four executives, and ECG2 is measured by the ratio of CEO cash compensation to the average cash compensation of the other top four executives.
The descriptive statistics analysis and correlation analysis results are manifested: in Table. 1. The correlation results show that there are positive or negative relationships of different strength among CEO age, ECG and most of the control variables. All of the correlation coefficients among control variables are less than 0.5, which means only weak and acceptable multicollinearity issue will occur when regression analysis is carried out. 9 CAGE it +ε it (1) Using the sample to simulate model 1, the regression results are shown in Table 2 . The regression coefficient of CAGE is significantly positive (B=0.016, P=0.000), which means there is a positive relationship between CEO age and ECG. H1b is confirmed. Second, the paper constructs a multiple regression model (Model 2) based on OLS by taking CEO age as the main predictor, selecting ECG2 as the dependent variable and adopting the seven control variables designed above. ECG 2it =α+β 1 RSB it +β 2 RID it +β 3 ROA it +β 4 FSIZE it +β 5 RFS it +β 6 DUAL it +β 7 TENURE it +β 8 CEOS it +β 9 CAGE it +ε it (2) Using the sample to simulate model 2, the regression results are shown in Table 3 . The regression coefficient of CAGE is still significantly positive (B=0.007, P=0.001), which means there is a positive relationship between CEO age and ECG. H1b is confirmed. In order to test the robustness of the research results, the paper uses the mean comparison method based on sample-grouping method to test the relationship between CEO age and ECG. According to the average value of CAGE, the whole sample is divided into two sub-samples, respectively HCAGE_sample and LCAGE_sample. The paper compares the mean of CEG1 and ECG2 between the two samples. Results are shown in Table 4 . According to Table 4 , the means of ECG1 of HCAGE_sample and LCAGE_sample are significantly different, and the former is higher than the later. And it is the same case for ECG2. The facts indicates that CEO age does increase ECG. H1b is confirmed again.
Conclusions
The paper spotlights the relationship between CEO age and ECG, which has been predicted implicitly in upper echelons theory, however, has not been empirically tested by past literature. The new finding is that CEO age has a positive effect on ECG. Such a result indicates that an older CEO would set higher ECG than an younger CEO would do, or in other words, a CEO generally chooses lower ECG when he/she is younger than the one the CEO chooses when he/she is older. The paper concludes that on the topic of the relationship between CEO age and ECG, the career concern theory and fairness favor theory which predict a negative effect of CEO age on ECG are less suitable in explaining relationship between the two than the signal theory and the overconfidence theory which predict a positive effect of CEO age on ECG.
The future study should pay attention to the following aspects: (1) Samples should go beyond the limitation of manufacturing companies; (2) Methods should adopt more stringent empirical models which considers the possible endogenous problems; (3) Suggestions in policy should be addressed in a greater manner.
